It seems that the NGOs Crisis in Egypt is generating more tension than it should be. Ending the current crisis in a “satisfactory” manner paves the way for a “satisfactory” relationship between the two countries in the future. To end it by a win-win solution, it might be helpful to recognize some observations.
First observation: the crisis has been viewed as a “political” more than a “legal” one. It is true that the crisis escalated as the Minister of International Cooperation raised concerns about unlicensed NGOs receiving unauthorized foreign funds. However, it is the Minister of Justice, a former President of the Court of Cassation, and the two investigating judges, who decided there is a reasonable ground for prosecution. It is not clear at this point whether or not the issue was discussed at the Cabinet meeting while the Minister of Defense (Head of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces-SCAF) attended it. It would appear, as Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-N.Y.) commented during a Wednesday hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the SCAF has been isolated from the judicial process.
Second observation: the reactions in the U.S. were “provoking” more than “helping” those in Egypt who want to solve this crisis. The U.S. threat to suspend the annual military aid to Egypt (more than $ 1 billion being received as part of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979) might have helped during the early days of the revolution to neutralize the Egyptian Army. But, using the same threat in the current context is perceived to be insulting and corrupting the outcome of an official prosecution and trial no matter what the outcome is.
Third observation: mapping the structure of power in the Second Republic of Egypt should not be hard for those interested in building healthy foreign relations. In his PhD dissertation “Struggle for Constitutionalism in Egypt,” (Yale University-1999) Bruce Rutherford notes three competing forms of constitutionalism that are embedded in distinct institutions: Liberal (in the Judiciary), Nationalistic (in the Presidency which overlapped with the Military during the First Republic), and Islamic (in the Muslim Brotherhood). In practice, this order and these institutions overlap. In a crisis, like the current one, these institutions, under foreign pressures and during election and transition times, might compete as nationalists.
In sum, it might be more helpful and efficient—in the short and long terms—to think of this crisis as a legal dispute. This should honor the parties and the institutions involved and create some space for arguing the law and the public policy particularly on the constitutional level. Investing in this kind of foreign policy allows more ground for mutual understanding through trans-judicial dialogue and diplomacy.
