Last week, the University of Kansas hosted a panel lecture on the political, economic and social state of Egypt moving into the new year. “Egypt 2013: Uncovering Misconceptions about the Muslim Brotherhood, anti-Islam Video, and Post-Revolution Changes” was co-sponsored by KU Students for Justice in the Middle East (SJME), KU Center for Global & International Studies, African and African American Studies, KU Middle East Studies and Kansas African Studies Center. I am honored for the opportunity to join this panel with Jacqueline Brinton, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies and Marwa Ghazali, Anthropology PhD candidate. I am very grateful to Hamzah Firman for helping me preparing for this event.
To explain how the
political system is developing in Egypt, I briefly explained how the current
developments fit in the history of struggle for democracy in Egypt during the
last century. The doctrine of separation of powers is on the top of some
constitutional values that Egyptians recognized during this struggle. In this
sense, the 1919 Revolution and the adoption of the 1923 Constitution represent
one step forward in terms of respecting this doctrine of separation of powers.
On the other hand, the 1952 Coup d'Etat and salvaging the 1945 constitution
draft represent one step backward by breaching this doctrine. The 1971
Constitution that existed during the 2011 uprising reveals a middle stage. “System
of Governance” in Part V allocated the state powers among 8 bodies. Three of them are the
classical branches of government: the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judicial. The remaining five bodies represent other key players that should fit
within the boundaries of the doctrine during drafting the new constitution.
They are (1) the Head of State, (2) the Supreme Constitutional Court (3) the
Armed Forces and the National Security Council, (4) the Police and (5) the
Socialist Public Prosecutor (which was abandoned in 2010 Amendments). The major
problem with this constitution was the articles allowing the president to have
absolute power over these bodies.
The question is: how
this formula of allocating the state powers was affected during the uprising
and during the transition process?
